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MEDICARE: WHAT ARE THE REAL PROBLEMS?  WHAT 
CONTRIBUTION CAN LAW MAKE TO REAL SOLUTIONS? 
TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST* 
In certain circles it is popular to present Medicare as a problem.  The 
Report of the Trustees of the Medicare Trust Fund, for example, is regularly 
full of gloom and doom.1  The 2007 Medicare Trust Fund Report predicts: 
The projected date of HI [Hospital Insurance] Trust Fund exhaustion is 
2019, one year later than in last year’s report, when tax income will be 
sufficient to pay only 79 percent of HI costs.  HI tax income falls short of 
outlays in this and all future years.  The program could be brought into 
actuarial balance over the next 75 years by an immediate 122 percent 
increase in the payroll tax, or an immediate 51 percent reduction in 
program outlays or some combination of the two.2 
Pro-market advocacy groups, such as the Heritage Foundation and the 
Cato Institute, argue that the Medicare program in its current form is 
“unsustainable” and must be changed, preferably through the use of 
 
* Robert L. Willett Family Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University School of Law.  The 
author gratefully acknowledges the support of the Frances Lewis Law Center for research for 
this article. 
 1. See, e.g., BD. OF TRS. OF THE FED. OLD-AGE & SURVIVORS INS. & FED. DISABILITY INS. 
TRUST FUNDS, STATUS OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE PROGRAMS: A SUMMARY OF THE 
2007 ANNUAL SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE TRUST FUND REPORTS (2007), available at 
www.ssa.gov/OACT/TRSUM/tr07summary.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 
TRUST FUND REPORTS SUMMARY].  Although the name of this body suggests neutral and 
dispassionate fiscal analysis, four of the six Trustees are political appointees of the President of 
the United States: the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services, and the Commissioner of Social Security.  Id. at 1.  One of the two 
public Trustees, Thomas R. Saving, is one of the most radical academic critics of social 
insurance in the United States. His views are exemplified in MEDICARE REFORM: ISSUES AND 
ANSWERS (Andrew J. Rettenmaier & Thomas R. Saving eds., The University of Chicago Press 
1999).  In the late 1990s, Saving received $431,230 in Medicare Reform Grants from the 
Lynde & Harry Bradley Foundation, one of the nation’s most influential right-wing advocacy 
foundations.  Thomas R. Saving, Resume, at http://econweb.tamu.edu/saving/saving%20 
resume.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2007); Media Transparency, The Lynde and Harry Bradley 
Foundation, Inc., at www.mediatransparency.org/funderprofile.php?funderID=1 (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2007). 
 2. 2007 TRUST FUND REPORTS SUMMARY, supra note 1, at A MESSAGE TO THE PUBLIC, 
MEDICARE. 
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“market” solutions.3  Health law scholar David Hyman has written a book 
(published by the Cato Institute) contending that Medicare embodies the 
seven deadly sins and undermines the cardinal virtues.4 
It is important, nevertheless, to remember that, for most of its 
constituencies, Medicare is not a problem but rather the solution to a 
problem.  Medicare continues to be popular with beneficiaries and, indeed, 
with the American public generally.5  It provides greater freedom of choice 
than virtually any private insurer as well as reasonably good coverage, 
particularly for hospital and physician services.6  Healthcare professionals 
and providers have done quite well financially under the Medicare program 
in its current form, which offers payment levels close to those offered by 
private insurers, pays more quickly than most private insurers, and almost 
never second-guesses treatment decisions.7  Moreover, Medicare is a real, 
although often largely invisible, boon to the families of the elderly and 
disabled.  For example, my life would be quite different if I would have had 
to spend the past two decades worrying about the medical expenses of my 
parents while they were still alive and of my mother-in-law who is now well 
into her nineties. 
When viewed from a larger public policy perspective, however, 
Medicare does present a problem; indeed, it presents several.  First, 
Medicare is a program with many coverage gaps and comparatively high 
 
 3. See J.D. Foster, The Social Security and Medicare Trustees Report Again—and Again 
Problems Have Worsened, WEB MEMO (The Heritage Found. Wash., D.C.), Apr. 24, 2007, at 
1, 3, available at www.heritage.org/Research/Budget/upload/wm_1430.pdf (last visited Aug. 
31, 2007); Cato Institute, Health Care: Medicare (2007), at www.cato.org/healthcare/ 
medicare.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2007). 
 4. DAVID A. HYMAN, MEDICARE MEETS MEPHISTOPHELES (2006). 
 5. Jill Bernstein & Rosemary A. Stevens, Public Opinion, Knowledge, and Medicare 
Reform, 18 HEALTH AFF. 180, 181 (1999) (stating that three-quarters of Americans believe that 
Medicare is “important to their own families”). 
 6. Traditional Medicare, unlike most private managed care plans, offers free choice of 
provider.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395a (2000).  Of physicians surveyed in 2006 for the Medicare 
Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), only 3.3% claimed they were not accepting new 
Medicare patients, whereas 13.7% claimed they were not accepting any new private health 
maintenance organization (HMO) patients.  MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO 
THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 104 (Mar. 2007), available at www.medpac.gov/ 
documents/Mar07_EntireReport.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2007) [hereinafter MEDICARE 
PAYMENT POLICY]. 
 7. In 2005, the last year for which data is available, Medicare physician payment rates 
were equivalent to approximately 83% of private insurance rates.  MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY, 
supra note 6, at 97.  Physicians, however, were more likely to report that they were “not very 
concerned” or “not at all concerned” about billing and paperwork or timeliness of payments 
with respect to Medicare than with respect to private commercial or Medicaid patients.  Id. at 
105, 110.  The number of physicians and hospitals accepting Medicare patients is increasing 
steadily.  Id. at 53, 108. 
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cost-sharing.  Although some of the biggest gaps in the program, including 
lack of coverage for prescription drugs and preventive care, have been 
partially plugged in recent years, the program still fails to cover chronic, 
long-term nursing home care and dental and vision care, has high 
coinsurance levels on the Part B side, and lacks a catastrophic benefit.8  
Medicare still covers only about 45% of the total healthcare costs of 
beneficiaries.9  Those who have good Medicare Advantage, retiree, 
Medicaid, or Medigap coverage are less burdened by cost-sharing.  But, 
those who do not qualify for or cannot afford these forms of gap coverage, 
often the group least capable of paying the excess cost, disproportionately 
bear the burden of cost-sharing in terms of proportion of income spent on 
healthcare.10 
Second, Medicare’s methods of paying for services are problematic.  
Medicare pays for services through administered price systems or through 
managed care programs.11  As other articles in this Symposium 
demonstrate, the Medicare Advantage program costs much more than 
traditional Medicare while offering few off-setting advantages.12  Indeed, the 
Medicare Advantage Program is best understood either as the product of a 
naive blind faith or as a response to aggressive and well-funded lobbying by 
the health insurance industry.13  Administered price systems, on the other 
 
 8. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE: MEDICARE AT A GLANCE 1 (Feb. 2007), 
available at www.kff.org/medicare/upload/1066-10.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2007) 
[hereinafter KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, MEDICARE AT A GLANCE]; see Susan Adler Channick, 
The Ongoing Debate Over Medicare: Understanding the Philosophical and Policy Divides, 36 
J. HEALTH L. 59, 73-75 (2003) (discussing the failed Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act). 
 9. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, MEDICARE AT A GLANCE, supra note 8, at 2. 
 10. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: NEW 
APPROACHES IN MEDICARE 199 (June 2004), available at www.medpac.gov/documents/ 
June04_Entire_Report.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2007) [hereinafter NEW APPROACHES IN 
MEDICARE]; Thomas Rice & Katherine A. Desmond, The Distributional Consequences of a 
Medicare Premium Support Proposal, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1187, 1213-14 (2004). 
 11. TIMOTHY S. JOST & SHARON L. DAVIES, THE LAW OF MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FRAUD AND 
ABUSE 7 (3d ed. 2002); Channick, supra note 8, at 66. 
 12. See Robert A. Berenson & Melissa A. Goldstein, Will Medicare Wither on the Vine? 
How Congress Has Advantaged Medicare Advantage—and What’s a Level Playing Field 
Anyway?, 1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 5, 5 (2007); Timothy D. McBride, Medicare 
Advantage: What are We Trying to Achieve Anyway?, 1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
(forthcoming May 2008). 
 13. See Alain C. Enthoven & Sara J. Singer, Market-Based Reform: What to Regulate and 
by Whom, 14 HEALTH AFF. 105, 106 (1995) (“[M]arket forces in health care if left unchecked 
can produce undesirable results.”).  In 2006, the health sector (doctors, drug companies, and 
hospitals, among other groups) spent $351.1 million on lobbying the federal government 
(13.8% of total spending on lobbying across all sectors).  Robert Steinbrook, Election 2008—
Campaign Contributions, Lobbying, and the U.S. Health Sector, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 736, 
738 (2007); see also Steven H. Landers & Ashwini R. Sehgal, Health Care Lobbying in the 
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hand, also present problems.  Underservice results when Medicare pays too 
little or does not pay at all (e.g., Medicare generally does not pay for the 
time involved in email or telephone communications between doctors and 
patients, thus such communications rarely occur).14  When Medicare pays 
too much, market distortions arise.  For example, overpayment for certain 
procedures has contributed to the increase in physician-owned specialty 
hospitals, such as those specializing in cardiac services.15  Fraud and abuse 
seem to follow both overpayment and underpayment.16 
The biggest problem with Medicare, according to the consensus of 
opinions, is that the program is unsustainable in the long-term as currently 
funded.17  While the Medicare Trust Fund Report must be recognized as a 
political statement, it also reflects the reality that the cost of Medicare will 
continue to increase dramatically in the future.  Moreover, the problematic 
nature of the Medicare program’s fiscal situation is accepted not just by 
right-wing advocacy groups, but also by the Comptroller General of the 
United States and centrist think tanks.18 
 
United States, 116 AM. J. MED. 474 (2004) (using Lobbying Disclosure Act reports to assess 
healthcare lobbying at the federal level). 
 14. Robert A. Berenson & Jane Horvath, Confronting the Barriers to Chronic Care 
Management in Medicare, 2003 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) w3-37, w3-40, available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.37v1 (last visited Aug. 31, 2007). 
Paying for these services appropriately, however, is very difficult.  Cf. id. at w3-39 to -40 
(noting that physicians will suffer financially when telephone and email communications are 
non-reimbursable, therefore threatening to freeze “innovation in how clinical care is 
practiced”). 
 15. See Jack Hadley & Stephen Zuckerman, Physician-Owned Specialty Hospitals: A 
Market Signal for Medicare Payment Revisions, 2005 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) w5-491, 
available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.491v1 (last visited Oct. 9, 
2007). 
 16. JOST & DAVIES, supra note 11, at 8-12; see also Elizabeth A. Weeks, Gauging the 
Cost of Loopholes: Health Care Pricing and Medicare Regulation in the Post-Enron Era, 40 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1215 (2005) (discussing the role of Medicare payment incentives in 
stimulating fraud and abuse). 
 17. See Foster, supra note 3, at 1, 3. 
 18. See Medicare: Comptroller General Walker Warns About Increasing Medicare, Social 
Security Costs on ‘Fiscal Wakeup Tour’, KAISER DAILY HEALTH POLICY REPORT (The Henry J. 
Kaiser Family Found., Menlo Park, CA), June 1, 2007, at www.kaisernetwork.org/ 
daily_reports/rep_index.cfm?hint=3&DR_ID=45293 (last visited Aug. 31, 2007); see also 
Joseph White, Protecting Medicare: The Best Defense is a Good Offense, 32 J. HEALTH POL. 
POL’Y & L. 221, 221-22 (2007) (noting that the challenge to Medicare comes not just from the 
right-wing, which has long opposed the program, but also from centrists who are legitimately 
concerned about Medicare’s long-term fiscal viability). 
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Medicare was created as a social insurance program.19  Part A,20 which 
covers inpatient hospital care and other institutional services, is funded 
through employer and employee payroll taxes, just like Social Security and 
European social insurance programs.21  Parts B22 and D23 are funded by a 
mixture of general revenue funds and beneficiary premiums.24 In 2006, 
funding was approximately 76% general revenue and 21% premiums.25  All 
of this income is put into trust funds out of which payments for Parts A, B, 
and D services are made.26 
As the population ages; as the baby boomers have moved through 
youth and middle age and are now approaching retirement; as Congress 
uses the trust funds to finance chronic deficit spending and tax cuts;27 and, 
most importantly, as the cost of healthcare continues to grow at a rate far in 
excess of the rate of general inflation (reflecting price and utilization 
increases as well as changes in the nature of healthcare and of disease), 
two concerns become obvious.  First, the cost of the Medicare program as a 
proportion of the gross domestic product will continue to grow; and, 
second, funding Medicare as it was funded in the past will be impossible.28 
Too much can be, and usually is, made of these problems.  In fact, the 
Medicare program will not go bankrupt and shut down.  Medicare is an 
 
 19. TIMOTHY S. JOST, DISENTITLEMENT? THE THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC HEALTH-CARE 
PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE 63-64 (2003) (discussing the historical foundations 
of the Medicare Program). 
 20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c to i-5 (2000). 
 21. 2007 TRUST FUND REPORTS SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 2; JOST, supra note 19, at 50-
51, 71-72, 85. 
 22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395j to w-4. 
 23. Id. §§ 1395w-101 to w-152 (Supp. IV 2004). 
 24. See 2007 TRUST FUND REPORTS SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 1. Part C, the Medicare 
Advantage program, covers Part A and B services through managed care. These services are 
funded in the same way that Part A and B services would otherwise be funded.  See Medicare 
Information Service, Medicare Part C, at www.medicare.org/content/view/17/51 (last visited 
Sept. 4, 2007). 
 25. See 2007 TRUST FUND REPORTS SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 3; JENNIFER O’SULLIVAN, 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, MEDICARE: PART B PREMIUMS CRS-3–CRS-4 (Sept. 2004). 
 26. The Hospital Insurance (HI) Trust Fund pays for Part A services.  The Supplemental 
Medical Insurance (SMI) Trust Fund pays for both Part B and Part D services.  2007 TRUST 
FUND REPORTS SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 1. 
 27. See Channick, supra note 8, at 59-60, 67. 
 28. 2007 TRUST FUND REPORTS SUMMARY, supra note 1, at A MESSAGE TO THE PUBLIC, 
MEDICARE; Channick, supra note 8, at 62.  On the relationship between the Medicare Trust 
Funds and the Federal budget, see OFFICE OF ECONOMIC POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE TRUST FUNDS AND THE FEDERAL BUDGET: AN EXPANDED 
EXPOSITION (Mar. 2004), available at www.treas.gov/offices/economic-policy/reports/ 
budget_trust_fund_3_23.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2007). 
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entitlement under federal law29 and will continue to pay its beneficiaries’ 
bills until Congress repeals or amends the law, regardless of the balance of 
the trust funds.30  Moreover, one must take seventy-year cost projections, 
common in political discussions about Medicare,31 with a grain of salt.32  To 
see why, consider that over the past five years housing prices in Los Angeles 
(L.A.) have increased 116%.33  The median home price in L.A. is currently 
$575,000.34  If one simply projects forward a compounded appreciation in 
the value of housing at this rate for seventy years, the median home in L.A. 
will cost $49 billion.  The conclusion drawn from this projection using the 
same analysis often applied to Medicare is clear—every homeowner in L.A. 
should sell now before housing becomes unaffordable. 
From the perspective of the sober policy (or financial) analyst, however, 
two things seem relatively clear.  First, housing costs are unlikely to continue 
to increase to the point where housing becomes completely unaffordable.  
In fact, housing price increases in L.A. have recently begun to stabilize.35  
(Similarly, healthcare price increases have stabilized in most other 
developed countries over the past two decades in comparison to price 
growth in the United States.)36  Second, if housing costs do continue to 
increase, we will find a way to deal with the higher costs.  For one thing, 
incomes will continue to grow, and, while housing might consume a larger 
proportion of income as it now does in many other countries,37 it will still be 
affordable.  We may also eventually start using one-hundred-year, inter-
 
 29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 426, 426-1(a), 1395c (2000). 
 30. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 426, 1395d, 1395k, which establishes Medicare entitlements 
without conditioning them on a particular funding source.  The word entitlement occurs over 
100 times in Title XVIII of the Social Security Act (which creates the Medicare program) and 
refers to the rights of beneficiaries and sometimes providers.  See JOST, supra note 19, at 31. 
 31. See, e.g., 2007 TRUST FUND REPORTS SUMMARY, supra note 1, at A MESSAGE TO THE 
PUBLIC, MEDICARE. 
 32. What is the Role of the Federal Medicare Actuary?, ISSUE BRIEF (Amer. Acad. of 
Actuaries, Wash. D.C.), Jan. 2002, at 3, available at http://actuary.org/pdf/medicare/ 
medicare_actuary_jan02.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2007) (“Seventy-five-year projections based 
on a large number of demographic and economic variables should be regarded with 
caution.”). 
 33. MSN Money Staff, Home Prices by City, MSN MONEY, Aug. 30, 2007, at 
http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Banking/HomebuyingGuide/HomePricesByCity.aspx 
(last visited Sept. 5, 2007). 
 34. HousingTracker.net, Los Angeles, California, June 1, 2007, at www.housing 
tracker.net/old_housingtracker/location/California/LosAngeles (last visited Sept. 5, 2007). 
 35. See id. 
 36. Chapin White, Health Care Spending Growth: How Different is the United States from 
the Rest of the OECD?, 26 HEALTH AFF. 154, 156 (2007). 
 37. See U.N. DEP’T. OF ECON. & SOC. AFF., STATISTICAL YEARBOOK at 201-205 tbl.22, 
U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/STAT/SER.S/26, U.N. Sales No. E/F.06.XVII.1 (50th ed. 2006). 
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generational mortgages, as do homeowners in Switzerland and Japan, 38  
but we will, nevertheless, develop solutions to the problem.  We will not see 
everyone sleeping in the streets while houses sit empty because no one can 
afford them. 
We will also solve the problem of financing Medicare.  But how?  A 
number of possible approaches currently are being discussed.  First, more of 
the costs could be shifted onto beneficiaries by increasing cost-sharing or 
decreasing benefits.  Indeed, one of the core beliefs of the consumer-driven 
healthcare (CDHC) movement is that we need more cost-sharing across the 
board.39  Increased cost-sharing, CDHC advocates contend, has many 
benefits.  It makes healthcare purchasers more prudent shoppers, less likely 
to waste money on unnecessary care, and more likely to shop around for 
the best prices and even for the best quality care.40  Some also argue that 
Medicare beneficiaries are quite wealthy compared to the working 
population and that they can and should be required to bear a greater 
share of the cost of their care.41 
However, there are several problems with increasing Medicare cost-
sharing.  First, although some Medicare beneficiaries are in fact quite 
wealthy, most are not.  Nearly half of all beneficiaries (approximately 47%) 
have incomes at 200% of the federal poverty level (FPL) or less.42  Less than 
one quarter have incomes exceeding 400% of the FPL.43  In 2001, the 
median net worth of households headed by a person age sixty-five to 
seventy-four was $176,000; however, on average, $129,000 of that value 
was tied to equity in their primary residence.44  Furthermore, as the head of 
the household gets older, this net worth declines.45  On average, Medicare 
beneficiaries spend nearly 20% of their income on healthcare; although, the 
median beneficiary spends only 10%.46  The beneficiaries who spend the 
most on healthcare, including older beneficiaries and those with chronic 
 
 38. James Daley, The Mortgage Gift Your Kids Won’t Thank You for, THE INDEPENDENT 
(London), Aug. 26, 2006, Features at 3. 
 39. See MICHAEL F. CANNON & MICHAEL D. TANNER, HEALTHY COMPETITION: WHAT’S 
HOLDING BACK HEALTH CARE AND HOW TO FREE IT 46-54 (2005); JOHN C. GOODMAN & 
GERALD L. MUSGRAVE, PATIENT POWER: SOLVING AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE CRISIS 231-59 (Cato 
Institute 1992). 
 40. CANNON & TANNER, supra note 39, at 51-57; GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, supra note 
39, at 249-51. 
 41. See, e.g., David A. Hyman, Medicare Meets Mephistopheles, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1165, 1175 (2003). 
 42. NEW APPROACHES IN MEDICARE, supra note 10, at 199. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 196. 
 45. Id. (noting that for households headed by a person aged seventy-five or older, 
median net worth declined to $151,000). 
 46. Id. at 197. 
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medical conditions, tend to have lower than average incomes and 
resources.  Statistics illustrating these facts show that beneficiaries with 
incomes below the federal poverty line spend nearly 45% of their income on 
healthcare; beneficiaries aged eighty-five years and older spend over 30%; 
and beneficiaries in poor health spend almost 30%.47  Medicare currently 
only covers about 45% of the total healthcare costs of its beneficiaries,48 
and many beneficiaries have a limited financial margin to cover additional 
costs. 
Second, shifting more costs to Medicare beneficiaries may not, in fact, 
improve efficiency.  Empirical arguments for cost-sharing are usually based 
on the findings of the Rand Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) from the 
1970s and 80s.49  The HIE, however, intentionally excluded persons over 
age sixty-two and the disabled, and, thus, cannot tell us exactly how those 
groups would respond to higher cost-sharing.50  Although the experiment 
found that, in general, persons who face higher cost-sharing spend less, it 
also found that they spend less on essential care to the same extent that they 
spend less on nonessential care.51  Moreover, although the experiment 
found that participants generally did not suffer adverse health consequences 
when they spent less on healthcare, it did find some adverse health 
consequences for the poor and persons with chronic diseases.52  
Subsequent studies, particularly of pharmaceutical cost-sharing, have shown 
that increased cost-sharing can, in fact, contribute to serious health 
problems.53  Finally, increasing Medicare cost-sharing will certainly result in 
both higher Medicaid expenditures (as Medicaid usually covers cost-sharing 
costs for dual eligibles)54 and higher Medicare “bad debt” reimbursement to 
hospitals.55 
A second and related approach to solving the problem of financing 
Medicare is to means test, i.e., charge wealthier beneficiaries higher 
 
 47. NEW APPROACHES IN MEDICARE, supra note 10, at 198. 
 48. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, MEDICARE AT A GLANCE, supra note 8. 
 49. See, e.g., JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE ET AL., FREE FOR ALL?  LESSONS FROM THE RAND HEALTH 
INSURANCE EXPERIMENT 341 (RAND 1993). 
 50. Id. at 11. 
 51. Id. at 162. 
 52. Id. at 201, 204, 208, 219, 243, 251, 259, and 339-40. 
 53. John Hsu et al., Unintended Consequences of Caps on Medicare Drug Benefits, 354 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2349, 2349 (2006); Robin Tamblyn et al., Adverse Events Associated with 
Prescription Drug Cost-Sharing Among Poor and Elderly Persons, 285 JAMA 421, 421 (2001). 
 54. See KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND., DUAL ELIGIBLES: MEDICAID’S ROLE FOR LOW-INCOME MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES (2005), 
available at www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/4091-04%20Final(v2).pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 
2007). 
 55. 42 C.F.R. § 413.89 (2007) (“[B]ad debts attributable to the deductibles and 
coinsurance amounts are reimbursable under the program.”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] MEDICARE: WHAT ARE THE REAL PROBLEMS? 53 
premiums for program participation.  Critics of the current program 
structure argue that millionaires should not be able to get Medicare 
coverage on the same terms as the poor.56  The Medicare Modernization 
Act (MMA) took a step towards means-testing Medicare by increasing Part B 
premiums for individual beneficiaries who annually earn more than 
$80,000 and couples who earn over $160,000 beginning in 2007, with 
further increases to be phased in over the next five years.57  The MMA also 
provided subsidies for low-income enrollees in the Part D drug program, 
effectively means-testing the Part D program since higher income 
beneficiaries receive less than those with lower incomes.58 
There are two primary problems with means testing as a strategy for 
saving Medicare.  First, as has already been noted, most Medicare 
beneficiaries are not very wealthy.  Therefore, increasing the premiums born 
by higher income beneficiaries is unlikely to make a substantial dent in the 
cost of the program.  The increased premiums for wealthier beneficiaries 
built into the MMA are projected to yield about $2 billion a year, which is 
only about one-half of 1% of program cost.59  Second, if premium costs for 
higher income beneficiaries become high enough, a market is likely to 
develop for private health insurance for seniors, allowing wealthier and 
healthier beneficiaries to opt out of Medicare.60  Thus, Medicare will be left 
with a more costly group of beneficiaries and, most likely, with weakened 
political support.61  Wealthy Medicare beneficiaries should, of course, 
contribute to the cost of the program.  However, they should do so as 
taxpayers, not as premium payers. 
A third proposal to “save Medicare” that has been around for a long 
time is to turn Medicare into a managed competition program similar to the 
Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, in the hope that competition 
will bring down costs.62  This was the goal of the Medicare+Choice 
 
 56. See, e.g., Stuart M. Butler, Time is Running Out for Medicare Reform, THE HERITAGE 
FOUND., Apr. 30, 1997, at www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/BG1112.cfm (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2007). 
 57. 42 U.S.C. § 1395r(i) (Supp. III 2003); see also O’SULLIVAN, supra note 25, at CRS-7–
CRS-8. 
 58. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-114. 
 59. Mark V. Pauly, Means-Testing in Medicare, 2004 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) w4-546, 
w4-547, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.546v1.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2007). 
 60. See Theodore R. Marmor & Jerry L. Mashaw, Understanding Social Insurance: 
Fairness, Affordability, and the ‘Modernization’ of Social Security and Medicare, 2006 HEALTH 
AFF. (WEB EXCL.) w114, w131; Robert Pear, Medicare Costs to Increase for Wealthier 
Beneficiaries, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2006, at A10. 
 61. See Marmor & Mashaw, supra note 60. 
 62. See Medicare Reform and Competition: Separating Fact from Fiction: Hearing Before 
the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 108th Cong. 72 (2003) (statement of Joseph R. Antos, 
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program when it was established in 1997 and is the goal of the Medicare 
Advantage program today. 63  As other articles in this Symposium establish, 
however, there is no evidence that Medicare Advantage is saving or can 
save money for Medicare.64  Indeed, Medicare Advantage is increasing 
program expenses.65  There may be reasons for having a Medicare 
managed care program, but saving money is not one of them. 
Another proposal put forth from time to time is to reduce costs by 
slowing Medicare’s adoption of new technologies.66  There is a good deal 
of comparative data that indicates that one of the reasons why the United 
States has the most costly healthcare system in the world is because we 
adopt new medical technologies sooner, disseminate them more quickly 
and broadly, and use them more frequently than most other countries.67 
Currently, Medicare does assess new technologies for coverage, but 
assessment is limited mainly to procedures and devices covered by Part B.68  
Part A providers are paid on a prospective payment basis and make their 
own judgments as to technology acquisition based on the funding that they 
have available.69  Part D drug plans are also free to make their own 
coverage decisions as long as basic categories and classes of drugs are 
covered.70 
Although new technologies generally add rather than save costs, they 
also often add considerable value.71  Therefore, any strategy aimed at 
cutting Medicare costs by limiting access to technology must consider how 
much we would be losing in potential enhanced value.  Controlling 
technology adoption, moreover, is very difficult politically.  An eight nation 
 
American Enterprise Institute); Stuart M. Butler & Robert E. Moffit, The FEHBP as a Model for a 
New Medicare Program, 14 HEALTH AFF. 47, 55-56 (1995). 
 63. See Brian Biles et al., Medicare Advantage: Déjà Vu All Over Again, 2004 HEALTH 
AFF. (WEB EXCL.) w4-586, w4-595, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/ 
hlthaff.w4.586v1.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2007). 
 64. Berenson & Goldstein, supra note 12, at 5-12; McBride, supra note 12. 
 65. Biles et al., supra note 63. 
 66. See Mark V. Pauly, What if Technology Never Stops Improving? Medicare’s Future 
Under Continuous Cost Increases, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1233, 1242 (2003). 
 67. See TIMOTHY S. JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK: A CRITIQUE OF THE CONSUMER-DRIVEN 
MOVEMENT 176 (2007). 
 68. See Timothy S. Jost, The Medicare Coverage Determination Process in the United 
States, in HEALTH CARE COVERAGE DETERMINATIONS 207, 211 (Timothy S. Jost ed., 2005). 
 69. Id. 
 70. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-104(b)(3) (Supp. III 2003); see also JACK HOADLEY ET AL., THE 
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE MEDICARE DRUG BENEFIT: AN IN-DEPTH EXAMINATION OF 
FORMULARIES AND OTHER FEATURES OF MEDICARE DRUG PLANS, at i, 1 (2006), available at 
www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7489.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2007). 
 71. DAVID M. CUTLER, YOUR MONEY OR YOUR LIFE: STRONG MEDICINE FOR AMERICA’S 
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 73, 75 (2004). 
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study of public-insurance program technology-coverage policies concluded 
that most other developed countries do not even try to apply cost-benefit 
analysis in deciding whether or not to cover technologies in their public 
programs, but instead only assess effectiveness.72  In most instances, 
moreover, technology advocates, be they technology sponsors, providers 
looking for new tools, or patients hoping for new cures, overwhelm those 
who try to hold the line on program costs in coverage proceedings.73 
Technology manufacturers are unlikely to give up the largest health 
insurance market in the United States without a fight.74  It is also hard to 
believe that Medicare beneficiaries would be willing to settle for second-
class medical care.  Hospitals will, in all likelihood, continue to purchase 
new technologies based on their own judgments of whether or not they are 
valuable, and once hospitals acquire such technologies it will be difficult to 
deny Medicare beneficiaries access to them.  Doctors will also worry that 
they will be held to the evolving standard of care of their profession, despite 
what Medicare may decide to pay for, and will do what they can politically 
to assure Medicare coverage.75  Thus, thinking that technology assessment 
alone will save Medicare is unrealistic. 
In the end, I believe three approaches show the most promise for 
addressing the increased costs of Medicare; although, none of them offer a 
magic bullet and all will be difficult to implement.  First, and probably most 
importantly, we will need to raise taxes.  We have chosen, I believe wisely, 
to finance healthcare for the elderly and disabled through a public program.  
Since Medicare began in the 1960s, an ever greater percentage of our 
population has become elderly and disabled.76  Over the next couple of 
decades this percentage will continue to grow.77  Thus, even if healthcare 
costs were not increasing at a rate in excess of general inflation, we would 
be paying more for healthcare costs from public funds because an ever 
 
 72. See Timothy S. Jost, What Can We Learn From Our Country Studies?, in HEALTH CARE 
COVERAGE DETERMINATIONS 236, 251 (Timothy S. Jost ed., 2005). 
 73. See id. at 259-60. 
 74. See id. at 229-30 (describing the participation of technology proponents in the 
current system). 
 75. See Miriam J. Laugesen & Thomas Rice, Is the Doctor in? The Revolving Role of 
Organized Medicine in Health Policy, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 289, 300 (2003). 
 76. In 1965, 9.5% of the U.S. population was over age sixty-five. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
TABLE HS-3, POPULATION BY AGE: 1900 - 2002, available at www.census.gov/statab/hist/HS-
03.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2007).  In 2005, this age group made up 12.4% of the 
population.  ADMINISTRATION ON AGING, STATISTICS ON THE AGING POPULATION, at www.aoa. 
gov/prof/Statistics/statistics.asp (last visited Sept. 29, 2007). 
 77. It is estimated that by 2030 the number of persons over age sixty-five in the United 
States will double and constitute 20% of the population.  ADMINISTRATION ON AGING, supra 
note 76. 
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greater percentage of the population will be above age sixty-five, and, 
therefore, covered by public insurance.  But, at the same time, the 
proportion of GDP spent on healthcare is rising in the United States.78  In 
other words, we are increasing the percentage of public funds used to pay 
for the increasing percentage of GDP spent on healthcare, and we are 
foolish to think we can do so without increasing public revenues. 
How we increase public revenues is vitally important.  It might have 
made sense in 1965 to pay for Medicare from payroll taxes.  Today, 
however, a greater percentage of our national income is received in forms 
other than wages,79 and an ever greater share of our national income is 
going to an ever smaller proportion of the population.80  It is unjust to 
finance Medicare with a regressive tax on wages because many poor 
workers would not otherwise even be paying taxes given that their incomes 
are so low.81  Over the past several years, a growing share of the program 
has been funded using general revenue; although, the MMA has tried to 
limit this growth.82  New program revenues, however, should come primarily 
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from extension of those tax cuts.  See AVIVA ARON-DINE, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES, 
THE SKEWED BENEFITS OF THE TAX CUTS, 2008-2017, 2-4, available at www.cbpp.org/2-5-07 
tax.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2007). 
 81.  Economists estimated that 121 million Americans would not have federal income tax 
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returns with zero or negative tax liability.  SCOTT A. HODGE, TAX FOUND., NUMBER OF 
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www.taxfoundation.org/files/ff54.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2007).  All employed and self-
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 82. Medicare Part A is funded by payroll taxes and Parts B and D are funded through 
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billion by the Part A (HI) Trust Fund and $230 billion by the Parts B and D (SMI) Trust Fund.  In 
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Fund will spend $478 billion. 2007 TRUST FUND REPORTS SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 5 tbl. 
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from a progressive income tax, perhaps combined with a consumption tax if 
it can be designed to be non-regressive. 
Of course no one likes taxes.  While they do impose a burden on the 
economy, the proportion of GDP spent on taxes in the United States is still 
lower than in most developed countries.83  At the high end, income tax rates 
are lower now than they were for most of the last century,84 a century that 
saw unprecedented economic growth.85  Even if Americans pay more in 
income tax to finance healthcare, their incomes are still likely to continue to 
grow as they have over the past century, leaving an ever larger amount of 
discretionary income for non-health expenditures.86  Also, we must 
remember that more money spent on healthcare means more jobs in 
healthcare—already one of the strongest growing sectors of our economy.87  
In particular, healthcare sector growth means more domestic jobs, since it is 
harder to outsource healthcare provision than, say, textiles or automobile 
production.  Additionally, more money spent on healthcare, including 
 
MMA requires the Trustees of the Medicare Trust Funds to project each year whether during 
that year or any of the six succeeding years the proportion of Medicare expenditures funded by 
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Countries, TAX NOTES (Tax Pol’y Ctr., Wash. D.C.), May 8, 2006, at 695, available at 
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Continues, 26 HEALTH AFF. 142, 143 tbl.1 (2007). 
 87. Between 2001 and 2006, the healthcare sector added 1.7 million jobs, while the rest 
of the private sector economy had zero job growth. Michael Mandel & Joseph Weber, What’s 
Really Propping Up the Economy?, BUS. WK., Sept. 25, 2006, at 54, available at 
www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_39/b4002001.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 
2007). 
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Medicare, will result in more money collected in taxes; although, of course, 
the Medicare program will not be self-financing. 
A second strategy is to limit the growth of provider payments.  One fact 
that clearly emerges from comparative analysis is that the United States pays 
higher prices for healthcare than any other developed nation.88  We 
consume about the same volume of drugs, hospital days, and physician 
visits as other countries, but we pay more for them.89  If we could cut our 
payment levels to those found in France or Germany, or even Canada or 
Switzerland, we could cut Medicare costs dramatically.90  Obviously how 
much and how fast Medicare can cut costs is limited.  But in the long run, 
American healthcare professionals, providers, and drug companies will have 
to learn to live with incomes and profits more like those enjoyed by their 
counterparts in other developed countries. 
Medicare has primarily controlled costs through, as noted above, 
administered prices.  Beginning with its DRG (diagnosis-related group) 
prospective payment system in 1982, Medicare has developed a series of 
prospective payment systems now covering virtually all of the services for 
which Medicare pays.91  While these prospective payment systems can be 
used effectively to cut costs, as was done following the Balanced Budget Act 
of 1997,92 the cost-cutting goal has rarely been accomplished.  The annual 
dance around the physician payment update, in which Congress invariably 
intervenes to raise prices paid to physicians even though physicians are 
already receiving higher incomes because of increased volume,93 illustrates 
the serious difficulty inherent in cutting, or even controlling, payments to 
providers. 
Medicare should use its prospective payment system more aggressively 
to slow down the growth of healthcare costs—it should actually deny 
physicians price increases if volume continues to increase dramatically.  
However, Medicare should also look to other purchasing approaches, as 
discussed later in this article. 
A third strategy for achieving Medicare savings is to focus on improving 
the quality of treatment beneficiaries receive.  A generation of work by Jack 
 
 88. Gerard F. Anderson et al., It’s the Prices, Stupid: Why the United States is so Different 
from Other Countries, 22 HEALTH AFF. 89, 90 (2003). 
 89. Id. at 93-103. 
 90. Id. at 91 tbl.1. 
 91. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4 (2000) (payment for physician’s services), § 1395ww 
(payment for inpatient hospital services), § 1395yy (payment for skilled nursing facility services 
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 92. MAYES & BERENSON, supra note 91, at 115. 
 93. See id. at 142-45. 
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Wennberg and his associates has shown conclusively that the use of 
Medicare services varies dramatically from one geographic area to another 
in ways that have little do with actual medical need.94  In particular, 
Wennberg has identified dramatic variations in what he terms “supply-
sensitive” services, i.e., services that tend to be provided in greater volume 
where the capacity to provide them is greater.95  Patients with non-surgical 
medical conditions, for example, are more likely to be hospitalized in 
regions with more hospital beds, and Medicare enrollees are seen by 
cardiologists more often in areas with more cardiologists.96  Supply-sensitive 
care accounts for a surprisingly high proportion of Medicare spending.97  
Most disconcerting, however, is the finding that some measures of quality, 
including mortality rates, may be worse in regions where supply-sensitive 
service use is higher.98  This finding leads to the conclusion that excess 
spending is doing harm, not good. 
At the same time that research has been demonstrating that a great deal 
of healthcare spending is on apparently unnecessary services, another body 
of research has shown that the nature of services provided to Medicare 
beneficiaries has been changing.  We have long known that a high 
percentage of Medicare payments go to beneficiaries with chronic diseases 
and with disabilities that limit their daily living activities.99  Nearly 80% of 
Medicare beneficiaries have at least one chronic disease,100 and one-fifth of 
Medicare beneficiaries with five or more chronic conditions account for two-
thirds of Medicare spending.101  There is evidence, however, that in recent 
years Medicare expenditures have grown most rapidly for beneficiaries who 
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do not have serious diseases or functional limitations.102  Much of this cost 
is attributable to the management of metabolic disorders, such as high 
blood pressure or high cholesterol, which are not themselves symptomatic 
diseases.103 
In a number of recent articles, Kenneth Thorpe and associates contend 
that a major factor in the increase of Medicare expenditures is the rise in 
obesity among the elderly.104  While, as just noted, chronic diseases are 
responsible for a significant proportion of Medicare costs, these costs are to 
some extent self-limiting.  That is, people with chronic diseases tend to die 
earlier; although their medical care costs more per year, they live fewer 
years.105  On the other hand, healthy people live longer; although their 
medical care costs less per year, their expenses accrue for more years.106  In 
the end, all beneficiaries die, and dying is usually expensive.107 
However, obese people, who often suffer from diabetes and 
hypertension among other conditions, not only need high cost medical care 
on a continual basis, but they also tend to live as long, probably even 
longer, than persons of normal weight.108  On the other hand, they tend to 
spend more years with disabilities limiting their daily activities.109  Thus, over 
a lifetime, they are very expensive to care for.  The proportion of Medicare 
beneficiaries who are obese has been growing rapidly in recent years, a fact 
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that may account for a considerable share of recent increases in Medicare 
costs.110 
One way to respond to the increase in obesity is to focus on better 
public health education for beneficiaries.111  As is true with many of the rest 
of us (or, in any event, me), many Medicare beneficiaries need to eat less 
and exercise more.  But changing lifestyles is very difficult at any age, and is 
unlikely to be easier for the elderly. 
In addition to focusing on improving beneficiaries’ health as a way to 
reduce costs, Medicare reform must also target the behavior of providers to 
assure that services are provided as appropriately, effectively, and efficiently 
as possible so that the number and intensity of Medicare services do not 
exceed the care level beneficiaries actually need.  Controlling the growth in 
provider payments; decreasing the frequency of the provision of 
unnecessary, inappropriate, or ineffective services; and providing more 
appropriate care for chronic diseases and metabolic disorders are all 
components of the effort to improve value purchasing within Medicare.112  A 
number of private sector programs and public demonstration projects are 
currently attempting to improve value purchasing, for example, through 
better chronic care and disease management or by paying for 
performance.113  Competitive purchasing programs also hold the promise of 
allowing Medicare to focus on value, i.e., higher quality at a lower price, in 
purchasing.114  Finally, fee-for-service Medicare might benefit from using 
traditional managed care tools—using limited networks of providers or 
tiered networks, or pre-procedure or admission review processes, for 
example, to maximize the value of purchased care.115 
There are three problems with implementing the value purchasing 
approach to saving Medicare.  First, we are not very good at it yet.  For 
 
 110. See Thorpe & Howard, supra note 102, at w382. 
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example, a recent Congressional Budget Office review of the literature on 
disease management concluded that although there is some evidence that it 
improves care for those with chronic diseases, there is no significant 
evidence that it saves money.116  Although Medicare has conducted several 
demonstration projects using case or disease management, there is no 
definitive evidence that these approaches can save money.117  While there is 
a great deal of interest in paying for performance, there is also concern that 
if not done right, it might increase disparities in healthcare or result in 
underservice for persons whose health problems are not targeted by the 
payment mechanism.118  Also, as recent British experience seems to have 
shown, paying for performance can offer opportunities for gaming the 
system which can result in increased costs.119 
Second, there is tremendous political opposition to value purchasing, at 
least insofar as it results in losers as well as winners on the provider side.120  
Everyone is in favor of competition, but no one wants to be a loser.  
Attempts to introduce competitive purchasing into Medicare have been 
blocked by politicians whose constituents complain about losing Medicare 
business.121  Medicare’s Centers of Excellence program, which seems to 
have been quite successful in improving care, had to be renamed because 
excluded providers complained that they, too, were excellent.122  Thus, 
across Medicare, limited-provider networks, tiered networks, or limited 
formularies would face tremendous political opposition. 
Finally, there are legal barriers to using value purchasing.  At its creation 
in 1965, Medicare offered benefits very similar to the contemporary Blue 
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Cross and Blue Shield plans, focusing on hospital and physician services.123  
The program’s creators went to great lengths to mollify the concerns of the 
doctors and hospitals whose cooperation was necessary for the program to 
succeed.124  The first provision of the Medicare statute prohibits government 
interference in the practice of medicine, while the second provision 
enshrines the principle of free choice of provider.125  The third provision of 
the statute guarantees beneficiaries the right to purchase private 
insurance.126  The 1965 statute established Medicare Parts A and B—two 
completely different programs with different financing mechanisms and 
different administrative, payment, and cost-sharing structures—to cover 
institutional services (Part A) and professional and related services (Part 
B).127  Like contemporary employment-related insurance programs, 
Medicare was designed to cover acute care and specifically excluded long-
term custodial care.128  The program did not include a catastrophic benefit; 
it imposed limits on hospital, nursing care, and home health benefits; and it 
did not establish limits on beneficiary cost-sharing.129  Furthermore, it did 
not cover outpatient drugs, preventive services, or nursing home care aside 
from 100 days of post-hospital extended care.130 
The program has evolved a great deal over the years, but much remains 
the same.  Although Medicare now has a drug benefit and covers more 
preventive care, it still provides only limited coverage for long-term care and 
offers no catastrophic benefit.131  It still takes a silo approach to care.  
Indeed, with the evolution of prospective payment systems over the years on 
a service-by-service basis, Medicare is more balkanized than ever.132  
Further, Medicare prospective payment legislation defines very specifically 
how each provider is to be paid,133 leaving little room for creativity and 
flexibility.  Although the Medicare program is pursuing a number of 
demonstration projects to explore better coordination of care, these are 
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narrow in their scope and usually limited by budget neutrality requirements 
that greatly constrain their flexibility.134  The Medicare program is also 
governed by the Administrative Procedures Act135 and its incrustations, which 
currently make formal regulatory action very difficult (particularly under an 
administration that is not a friend of social insurance). 
Constitutional impediments are unlikely to block value purchasing in 
Medicare.  Not all courts have found that providers have a property or 
liberty interest in Medicare participation, and even those courts that do find 
a constitutionally protected interest tend to defer to program decisions.136  
But the current Medicare statute does impose a straitjacket on the Medicare 
program that deprives it of much of the flexibility that would be needed to 
make value purchasing a reality.137 
From the 2000 election through the 2006 election, those in power in 
Washington have appeared to place their hopes for Medicare reform on 
moving Medicare toward defined contribution or consumer-driven models in 
the long run and on Medicare managed care in the short run.138  Medicare 
managed care has failed, and moving to consumer-driven or defined-
contribution models is neither advisable as a matter of policy nor possible as 
a matter of politics.139  It is time to turn our attention to how to make 
traditional Medicare work better.  The focus should be on allowing 
traditional Medicare to engage in value purchasing, which will require 
changing the Medicare statute.  Section 1,140 for example, should be 
amended to remove the non-interference provision and replace it with a 
positive statement that Medicare is responsible for assuring that providers, 
professionals, and suppliers offer beneficiaries effective, appropriate, and 
high-quality care.  Section 2141 should be amended to remove the free 
choice of provider language and replace it with a statement that 
beneficiaries are entitled to a choice of high-quality and efficient providers, 
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suppliers, and professionals.  Whole sections of the statute need to be 
amended to allow more flexibility in purchasing.  In particular, the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services should be given broad statutory 
authority to fund demonstration projects in value purchasing without being 
tied down by immediate budget neutrality requirements.  Instead, budget 
neutrality should be assessed over the long term because a little extra 
spending now might save a great deal in the future. 
In conclusion, while Medicare has been a success overall, it does have 
problems.  The long-term survival of the Medicare program does depend on 
increased tax funding, but provider costs also need to be controlled.  
Medicare also needs to improve its value-purchasing ability in order to both 
save money and improve beneficiary care.  In the end, however, changes in 
Medicare policy will require changes in the Medicare law.  This article has 
suggested where these changes might begin. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
66 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:45 
 
